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McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
 Jorge Luis Valarezo-Tirado petitions this Court for 
review of an Immigration Judge’s reinstatement of his prior 
order of removal. The IJ affirmed a Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) asylum officer’s determination that Valarezo-
Tirado did not have a reasonable fear of torture as required for 
relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) or a 
reasonable fear of persecution as required for asylum and 
withholding of removal. Valarezo-Tirado appeals the IJ’s 
denial of his CAT claim. For the reasons that follow, we will 
grant the petition for review and vacate the IJ’s decision and 




A. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
Jorge Luis Valarezo-Tirado, an Ecuadorian citizen, 
entered the United States illegally in 2017. He was 
subsequently detained by DHS, and in January 2020, DHS 
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reinstated a prior order of his removal.1 However, before he 
was actually removed, DHS conducted a reasonable fear 
interview in front of an asylum officer because Valarezo-
Tirado claimed a fear of persecution if he were returned to 
Ecuador. That interview began on February 20, 2020. At the 
start of the interview, Valarezo-Tirado was twice informed of 
his right to postpone the interview for up to 48 hours to procure 
an attorney.2 He was also provided with a list of pro bono and 
low-cost attorneys who may be willing to represent him. 
However, both times he was asked, he declined, and decided 
to proceed with the interview that day without an attorney.3 
 
Valarezo-Tirado told the asylum officer that in 2016 he 
had a dispute with a neighbor, Enrique Villa, in his hometown 
of Pedro Vicente Maldonado, Ecuador. Valarezo-Tirado sold 
Villa a load of lumber. When Valarezo-Tirado went to collect 
payment, Villa refused to pay.4 Valarezo-Tirado then went to 
the local police to file a report about Villa’s refusal, but the 
police allegedly told Valarezo-Tirado not to file a police report. 
According to Valarezo-Tirado, “they told me not to do 
anything, that he will pay me; that I should leave it alon[e] 
[and] that he will pay me.”5 Officers also told Valarezo-Tirado 
that Villa was “involved in some dark business.”6 Villa was 
allegedly known in the community to have ties to drug 
trafficking.7  
 
1 DHS had previously detained Valarezo-Tirado and issued a 
Form I-860 Determination of Inadmissibility and Order of 
Removal on September 6, 2015. (App. 33.) DHS removed 
Valarezo-Tirado to Ecuador on October 23, 2015. (App. 32.) 
The events giving rise to this appeal occurred after Valarezo-
Tirado’s removal in 2015. 
2 (App. 21, 22.) 
3 (App. 21, 22.) 
4 (App. 26) (“I expressed myself very strongly asking him 
to pay me. In addition, I threatened him that if he did not 
pay me in good terms; I was going to go to the police.”) 
5 App. 26. 
6 Id. 
7 (Id. at 23) (“I had a problem with a person that is linked 
to drug trafficking. . . . Enrique Villa, I know him by this 




Valarezo-Tirado told the asylum officer that based on 
the inaction of the local police, he believed Villa “ha[d] some 
kind of friendship with the police and the police would have 
told [Villa] that I came to file a report against him.”8 
Accordingly, Valarezo-Tirado did not file a police report. 
However, as Valarezo-Tirado later told the IJ, he returned to 
Villa’s house to demand his money a second time. Rather than 
paying Valarezo-Tirado, Villa threatened him with a pistol: “he 
told me to leave things alone or something will happen to my 
family or me.”9  
 
Fearing for his and his family’s safety, Valarezo-Tirado 
fled to the United States with his family. Valarezo-Tirado told 
the asylum officer that since he fled his hometown, he “heard 
[Villa] was in jail one time, that he had [a] problem with the 
police.”10 Valarezo-Tirado clarified that he believed that the 
state or provincial police had detained Villa.11 He told the 
asylum interviewer that the state and provincial police were 
separate forces than the local police who previously 
discouraged him from filing a police report.12 
 
The DHS asylum officer found that Valarezo-Tirado 
was “credible,” meaning that his testimony was “consistent, 
detailed, and plausible,”13 but that he did not establish a 
reasonable fear of persecution or torture if removed to 
Ecuador.14 As to past torture, the asylum officer concluded 
“[t]he limited harm experienced by the applicant (verbal 
threats of unspecified harm) does not rise to the level of severe 
physical or mental pain required to constitute torture.”15 And 
“[t]he incident did not cause the applicant any physical harm 
and there is no indication that the applicant experienced any 
prolonged mental suffering from the experience.”16 
 
8 Id. at 26. 
9 Id. at 24.  
10 Id. at 25. 
11 (Id. at 26.) 
12 (Id. at 26) (“[T]he police in my town can be friends with 
him but not the state or provincial police.”) 
13 Id. at 29. 
14 (Id. at 20, 29–31.) 





As to the threat of future torture, the asylum officer 
found that Valarezo-Tirado “failed to provide specific and 
persuasive facts that a public official such as a corrupt police 
officer would specifically intend to inflict on him severe 
harm.”17 The officer also concluded that Valarezo-Tirado 
“failed to provide specific and persuasive evidence to establish 
a reasonable possibility that a public official would consent or 
acquiesce to his future harm by Mr. Villa.”18  
 
Valarezo-Tirado appealed the DHS asylum officer’s 
negative credible fear determination to an IJ. At the beginning 
of the hearing before the IJ, the IJ had the following exchange 
with Valarezo-Tirado about his right to counsel: 
IJ: You do have the right to be represented in this 
hearing by an attorney but at no expense to the 
Government. You previously received a packet 
that listed your rights in these proceeding[s]. 
You also received a list of attorneys and 
organizations that might be willing to represent 
you at little or no cost. Do you remember getting 
that list? 
Valarezo-Tirado: Yes. 
IJ: Okay. You don’t have an attorney here with 
you today but because these are expedited 
proceedings, I can’t give you any more time to 
find an attorney. All right. Sir, have you 




The IJ then summarized Valarezo-Tirado’s prior 
testimony from the credible fear interview and allowed him to 
expand on why he felt he could not report Villa to the police. 
Valarezo-Tirado stated that he was afraid that Villa had friends 




19 Id. at 6–7. 
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report.20 The IJ concluded that she understood that Valarezo-
Tirado was afraid to return, “but the problem is that in order . . 
. for you to be able to seek relief in this country you have to 
fear persecution on account of a protected ground.”21 She 
found “[t]he situation that you are facing seems to be more of 
a personal matter. Because of that, sir, I do not find that you’ve 
established a reasonable possibility that you would be 
persecuted on account of one of these protected grounds.”22 
The IJ also stated that she “concur[red] in [DHS’] reasonable 
fear determination.”23 Her written opinion stated, in its 
entirety: “R not targeted on account of protected ground. 
Government is willing to assist.”24  
 
Valarezo-Tirado now petitions for review.25 
 
II. 
Valarezo-Tirado raises the following three arguments 
on appeal: (i) the IJ’s conclusion that he did not have a 
reasonable fear of torture was not supported by reasonable, 
 
20 (App. 9) (“I think that he either . . . had friends in the 
police department or that the police work with him 
because when I went to report him, they, the police tell 
me, don’t, don’t do it, just wait for him to pay you because 
he has own shady businesses.”) 
21 Id. at 11. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 1. 
25 Because Valarezo-Tirado was subject to a reinstated order 
of removal, DHS had exclusive jurisdiction to consider 
Valarezo-Tirado’s reasonable fear claim under 8 C.F.R. § 
208.31(a) in the first instance. The IJ had jurisdiction to 
review DHS’ negative reasonable fear determination under 8 
C.F.R. §§ 208.31(a), (g). Where an “IJ concurs with the 
asylum officer’s decision that the applicant did not establish a 
reasonable fear of persecution or torture, . . . ‘[n]o appeal 
shall lie from the [IJ]’s decision.’” Bonilla v. Sessions, 891 
F.3d 87, 90 n.4 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 
208.31(g)(1)). An IJ’s decision concurring with an asylum 
officer’s negative credible fear determination is, therefore, a 
final order of removal. Id. We have jurisdiction to review 
final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. See also id. 
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substantial, and probative evidence on the record as a whole; 
(ii) the IJ violated his due process rights by failing to “develop 
his testimony” as to his fear of torture if returned; and (iii) the 




In order to obtain relief under the CAT, Valarezo-
Tirado must show “that it is more likely than not that he would 
be tortured upon return to his country”26 and that the torture 
would occur “by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or 
acquiescence of, a public official . . . or other person acting in 
an official capacity.”27 “Acquiescence of a public official 
requires that the public official, prior to the activity 
constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and 
thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to 
prevent such activity.”28 It is the IJ’s responsibility in the first 
instance to decide if Valarezo-Tirado has demonstrated 
eligibility for CAT relief.29 We review an IJ’s findings of fact 
under an “‘extraordinarily deferential standard’ [and] we 
uphold the IJ’s findings if they are ‘supported by reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as 
a whole.’”30  
 
Given the IJ’s less-than-terse explanation of her denial 
of CAT relief, it becomes necessary to again stress that “the 
availability of judicial review . . . necessarily contemplates 
something for us to review.”31 This means that an IJ (or the 
BIA) must explain a decision “with such clarity as to be 
 
26 Saravia v. Att’y Gen., 905 F.3d 729, 735 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(internal citation omitted). 
27 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). 
28 Id. § 1208.18(a)(7). 
29 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (The trier of fact, the IJ, “shall 
determine whether the [noncitizen] has sustained the 
[noncitizen’s] burden of proof.”). 
30 Romero v. Att’y Gen., 972 F.3d 334, 340 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(quoting Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 
2011)). 
31 Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 555 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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understandable.”32 And “[a]lthough we ask, in evaluating 
whether an agency determination is supported by substantial 
evidence, ‘whether a reasonable fact finder could make such a 
determination based upon the administrative record,’ we will 
not supply the basis for its decision where appropriate reasons 
are not set forth by the [IJ] itself.”33 Given the bullet point-like 
checklist that purported to explain the IJ’s decision here, we 
stress that, “[w]here the administrative decision fails to 
consider or mention evidence that is on its face relevant and 
persuasive, the proper course is to remand for further 
consideration by the IJ.”34  
 
Valarezo-Tirado alleges that the IJ’s conclusion that he 
does not have a reasonable fear of torture if returned to Ecuador 
is not supported by substantial evidence. We agree. The 
entirety of the IJ’s written decision rejecting his claim states: 
“R not targeted on account of protected ground. Government 
is willing to assist.”35 With nothing more than that bare 
conclusion—“[g]overnment is willing to assist”—we have no 
way of determining what evidence, if any, the IJ relied upon. 
“An IJ must support her factual determinations with ‘specific, 
cogent’ reasons such that her conclusions ‘flow in a reasoned 
way from the evidence of record.’”36 Failure to provide such 
support “does not pass muster under the substantial evidence 
rubric.”37 
 
Valarezo-Tirado argues not only that there is no 
evidence in the record to support the IJ’s conclusion; he claims 
that the record evidence supports the opposite conclusion. He 
believes this record supports the conclusion that the police 
were unwilling or unable to assist. He points to his testimony 
before the asylum officer and before the IJ. He testified that the 
police told him not to file an official police report because Villa 
 
32 Wang v. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 241 (1947)). 
33 Id. at 271 (citing Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 249) 
(emphasis added). 
34 Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007). 
35 App. 1. 
36 Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 250 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
37 Id. (citing Dia, 353 F.3d at 254). 
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was into “some dark business.”38 He told the IJ: “when I went 
to report [Villa], they, the police [told] me, don’t, don’t do it.”39 
The government, on the other hand, points to Valarezo-
Tirado’s testimony before the asylum officer in which he stated 
that, at one point after Valarezo-Tirado fled his hometown, he 
heard that the provincial police had detained Villa.40  
 
Therein lies the problem. The IJ’s failure to provide a 
citation or reference to anything in the record leaves us 
guessing at the evidence she relied upon and gives us 
“[nothing] to review.”41 “[W]e cannot give meaningful review 
to a decision in which [an IJ] does not explain how it came to 
its conclusion.”42 Valarezo-Tirado is correct when he argues 
that although the government “suggests ways in which 
[Valarezo-Tirado’s] testimony might have supported [the IJ’s] 
conclusion,”43 the government can only guess whether the IJ 
even considered the evidence of Villa’s alleged arrest by 
provincial police. We fare no better. It “would be improper for 
us to speculate as to whether” the IJ considered such evidence, 
or how it factored into her conclusion.44 The basis for the IJ’s 
decision “can and should be addressed explicitly by the [IJ] 
upon remand.”45  
 
We have previously granted a petition for review in 
which the alleged basis for the BIA’s denial of relief was that 
“the evidence is insufficient” and “the arguments made by the 
[government] on appeal . . . are persua[sive]” because we could 
not “perform meaningful review of [such an] order.”46 Here, 
we have even less to work with.   
 
We realize, of course, that the IJ and BIA have a 
tremendous caseload and very crowded dockets. We have 
taken pains to note that the large number of cases on IJs’ and 
 
38 App. 9. 
39 Id. 
40 (See Resp’t’s Br. at 11.) 
41 Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 555. 
42 Awolesi v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 227, 229 (3d Cir. 2003). 
43 Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 15–16. 
44 Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 617 (3d Cir. 2005). 
45 Id. 
46 Awolesi, 341 F.3d at 229. 
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the BIA’s dockets “impose[] practical limitations on the length 
of the [IJ’s and] BIA’s written opinions.”47 However, we will 
not permit crowded dockets or a backlog of cases to excuse an 
IJ or the BIA from providing a meaningful explanation of why 
someone has been denied relief under the asylum laws or the 
CAT. The most fundamental notion of due process must 
include an opportunity for meaningful judicial review. We 
reiterate that “judicial review necessarily requires something to 
review and, if the agency provides only its result without an 
explanation of the underlying fact finding and analysis, a court 
is unable to provide judicial review.”48 The required review is 
simply not possible when we are provided with nothing more 
than the kind of one-line checklist that is relied upon here. We 
cannot allow an IJ or the BIA to dispense with an adequate 
explanation of a final decision merely to facilitate or 
accommodate administrative expediency.  
 
Since “the [IJ]’s failure of explanation makes it 
impossible for us to review its rationale, we [will] grant 
[Valarezo-Tirado’s] petition for review, vacate the [IJ’s] order, 
and remand the matter to [the IJ] for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.”49 
 
B. 
Valarezo-Tirado also argues that the IJ had a duty to 
develop his testimony about government acquiescence to 
torture because that troubled the IJ and was dispositive in her 
denial of his claim.50 He supports this argument by citing to 
our line of cases requiring IJs to provide notice to a noncitizen 
before denying his or her claim for a lack of corroboration. In 
Toure, for example, we stated that the IJ “has a duty to develop 
[the noncitizen’s] testimony, especially regarding an issue that 
she may find dispositive, and . . . must adequately explain the 
reasons for [her] decisions.”51 The IJ must also “give the 
[noncitizen] notice of what corroboration will be expected and 
an opportunity to present an explanation if the [noncitizen] 
 
47 Voci, 409 F.3d at 613 n.3. 
48 Dia, 353 F.3d at 268 (Stapleton, J., dissenting) (citing 
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 196–97). 
49 Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 555.  
50 (Pet’r’s Br. at 11.) 
51 443 F.3d at 325 (internal citation omitted). 
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cannot produce such corroboration.”52 This “rule derives 
principally from the fact that we cannot have meaningful 
judicial review without giving the applicant notice and an 
opportunity to corroborate.”53 
 
As we have already discussed, however, the IJ did not 
adequately explain the reasons for her decision. Consequently, 
we cannot determine if the IJ erroneously relied on a lack of 
corroborating evidence. On remand, therefore, to the extent 
that the IJ concludes Valarezo-Tirado must come forth with 
corroborating evidence, she must reopen the proceedings, 
inform Valarezo-Tirado of the evidence that requires 
corroboration, and must give Valarezo-Tirado an opportunity 




Finally, Valarezo-Tirado argues that he was denied his 
right to counsel and therefore requires a new hearing at which 
counsel will be present. We cannot agree with that claim.  
 
“[A]lthough the Fifth Amendment does not mandate 
government-appointed counsel for [noncitizens] at removal 
proceedings, it indisputably affords [a noncitizen] the right to 
counsel of his or her own choice at his or her own 
expense.”55 In removal proceedings, the right to counsel 
imposes certain obligations on the IJ. She must “[a]dvise the 
[noncitizen] of his or her right to representation, at no expense 
to the government, by counsel of his or her own choice . . . and 
require the [noncitizen] to state then and there whether he or 
she desires representation.”56 She must also “[a]dvise the 
[noncitizen] of the availability of pro bono legal services for 
the immigration court location at which the hearing will take 
 
52 Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 192. 
53 Saravia, 905 F.3d at 738. 
54 See id. (An IJ must provide the petitioner with “notice [of 
the facts requiring corroboration and] an opportunity to 
provide corroborating evidence or explain its 
unavailability.”). 
55 Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 2010). 




place, and ascertain that the [noncitizen] has received a list of 
such pro bono legal services providers.”57 If an IJ fails to do 
so, the noncitizen is entitled to a new hearing without a 
showing of prejudice.58 
 
Valarezo-Tirado argues that because there is a right to 
counsel in removal proceedings, that same right should be 
recognized in reviews of credible fear determinations. We have 
recognized, however, that the credible fear interview process 
differs from removal proceedings and, concomitantly, so do 
the protections offered to noncitizens in either process.  
 
In Bonilla, we recognized this difference and denied a 
claim similar to the one Valarezo-Tirado now brings. That case 
is instructive. There, petitioner Sorto Bonilla was similarly 
subject to a reinstated removal order but expressed a fear of 
returning to his home country.59 He appeared before the 
asylum officer with counsel but was unsuccessful. He appealed 
the asylum officer’s negative decision to an IJ.60 However, 
Sorto Bonilla appeared before the IJ without counsel.61 The IJ 
agreed with the asylum officer’s negative credible fear 
determination and ordered Sorto Bonilla removed. Sorto 
Bonilla then petitioned for review in this Court arguing that he 
was denied his right to counsel.62  
 
We recognized that the regulations governing reviews 
of credible fear determinations “state that [a noncitizen] ‘may 
be represented by counsel’ at the screening process’ first 
step—the interview with the asylum officer”—but found that 
“the regulations are silent as to whether [a noncitizen] may 
have counsel present at the second step of the screening process 
before the IJ.”63 We concluded that Sorto Bonilla had “not 
shown that the regulations explicitly invested him with a right 
to counsel at the IJ’s review hearing, and we need not reach the 
question [] whether he otherwise has such a right . . . because 
 
57 Id. at 92 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1)–(2)). 
58 See Leslie, 611 F.3d at 180. 
59 891 F.3d at 89. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 90. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c), (g)). 
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Sorto Bonilla ‘was not denied the opportunity to obtain the 
counsel of his choice.’”64 The same result obtains here. 
 
Valarezo-Tirado cannot show that he was denied the 
opportunity to obtain counsel. Valarezo-Tirado was 
specifically asked if he wished to stop the proceedings to 
obtain counsel at his credible fear interview. In fact, as quoted 
above, the hearing officer gave him that opportunity twice and 
also offered a list of pro bono and low-cost lawyers whom he 
could consult if he wished to briefly postpone the hearing.65 He 
declined and stated that he wanted to proceed with the 
interview that day.66 
 
His claim regarding the hearing before the IJ fares no 
better. Valarezo-Tirado “was notified that the IJ may allow him 
to be represented at the proceeding and instructed that his 
counsel should be present if he wished to be represented,”67 but 
Valarezo-Tirado appeared at the hearing without counsel. At 
the beginning of the hearing, the IJ asked Valarezo-Tirado if 
he had received information at his credible fear interview about 
his ability to have a lawyer for the hearing before the IJ.68 He 
affirmed that he had.69 Also, as in Bonilla, “the IJ noted that 
[Valarezo-Tirado] did not have counsel present, further 
reflecting that the IJ was cognizant of the value of legal counsel 
and did not deprive him of it.”70 Valarezo-Tirado neither 
objected nor asked for a lawyer during the hearing before the 
IJ. Accordingly, he has not shown that he was denied counsel 
before the IJ. 
III. 
 
 We realize, and “readily acknowledge that an IJ’s 
position is an impossibly demanding and challenging one.”71 
We have already commented on this above. Moreover, we 
 
64 Id. (quoting Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 376 (3d 
Cir. 2003)). 
65 (See App. 21–22.) 
66 (Id.) 
67 Bonilla, 891 F.3d at 92. 
68 (App. 6–7.) 
69 (App. 7.) 
70 Bonilla, 891 F.3d at 92. 
71 Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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recognized in 2011 that “IJs [were] confronted with an 
exponential growth in their caseloads,” noting that the average 
immigration judge handled over 1500 cases in a year.72 And 
the volume continues to increase.  
 
 A 2019 study found that “on average each 
[immigration] judge currently has an active pending caseload 
of over two thousand cases.”73 Nevertheless, we cannot allow 
incredibly difficult logistics to give license to IJs to skirt their 
responsibilities. This includes the obligation to inform the 
petitioner of the reasons for the IJ’s decision and provide an 
adequate explanation of the decision that does not require us to 
parse through the testimony in search of evidence that supports 
it. A two-sentence recitation on a bullet-point form will rarely, 
if ever, provide sufficient reasoning for a decision. A decision, 
such as the one here, that does not refer to record evidence will 
never suffice. Because, here, the IJ’s decision was not 
supported by substantial evidence, we will vacate the decision 
and order and remand to the IJ for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
72 Id. at 208 & n.10. 
73 Crushing Immigration Judge Caseloads and Lengthening 
Hearing Wait Times, TRAC Immigration (Oct. 25, 2019), 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/579/.  
